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Though historical sequences of Western civilization are capable of
being described by a simple, unilinear, evolutionary theory of history,
attempts to generalize unilinear theories beyond Western cultural areas
have failed. Thus the attempts of modem "Marxists" to generalizeMarx
and Engels' "theory of history" beyond its scope of application,
Western civilization, have met with the expected results. Their sequence
of stages of history simply do not fit other cultural areas. The
Marx-Engels theory of history was explicitly designed for a single case
and has little or no application outside that case.The theory therefore
has no explanatory power and may be viewed as simply a tool for
describing a single case. Extension of the theory beyond that case
would require modification, specifically conceptual elaboration, such
that it becomes more than simply descriptive.
The basis of the stages of the Marx-Engels theory was to be found in
the prevailing forms of ownership (or in other words, forms of division
of labor). The first historical form was that of "tribal ownership"
characterized only by a natural division of labor based on natural
differences such as sex and age. In this stage there is no specialized
production, and the people support themselves by hunting, fishing, or
'slash and burn' agriculture.
An increase in population brings about the second form of
ownership, "state ownership," the result of the union of several tribes,
some tribes becoming slaves to others, and the development of slaves as
a means of production. Private property develops in this stage, and the
country becomes divided from the city, with power concentrated in the
latter. Marx and Engels seem to have had Rome in mind in their
description of this stage.
The explanation of the transition from the stage of state property to
the apparently more backward stage of feudalism is somewhat elusive.
They explain that "Rome indeed never became more than a city; its
connection with the provinces was almost exclusively political."! War,
they said,cannot explain history.2 History is not a question of taking
but of that which is taken, the productive forces. 3 In fact, Marx and
Engels did not really explain why the barbarians were able to take
Rome.
Nevertheless, with the downfall of Rome and all of its contending
classes, the center of power shifts to the countryside, and the feudal
stage begins. Here land and serfs rather than slaves form the basic means
of production. Feudal organization was represented in the city by the
guild; however, guilds were unable to monopolize the urban means of
production. Thus the bourgeoisie appeared. Marx and Engels explained
the rise of the bourgeoisie as a consequence of foreign markets,
particularly those overseas; but this explanation seems to ignore the
fact that industrial capitalism created its own markets by producing
cheaply. This cheap production drew nearly all classes of society into
the commercial market, whereas at all previous historical stages the
majority were not involved. Nevertheless, neither the success of
capitalism in foreign markets nor cheap production are sufficient to
explain the rise of the bourgeoisie themselves.
The rest of the theory is well-known. The dialectic, heretofore
strangely absent, now becomes the explanation of change. The
bourgeoisie and feudal aristocracy battle until the success of the former
who are, in tum, expected to struggle with the proletariat. The former
resulted in capitalism, the latter should have resulted in communism.
It may be argued that Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism was intended to present a more complete explanation of the
transition from feudalism to capitalism. While it is evident, as Marx and
Engels claimed, that the existence of a bourgeoisie implies the existence
of a proletariat, it is not at all obvious that the existence of the feudal
aristocracy presupposes a bourgeoisie. The central explanatory problem
of this transition was the explanation of the source of the bourgeois
class. To Weber, given certain material conditions, the appearance of
this class depended on the development of an ethic compatible with the
notion of rational accumulation of capital. Feudalism is thus not itself a
sufficient condition for the rise of the bourgeois class. Given the ethic,
actions of the modern industrial type can begin, creating social
relationships which become the material forces determining further
developments.
As helpful as this addition is, it does not solve the central problem,
unilinear development. Weber's concepts suggest a solution to this
problem also. Feudal organization, in Weber's terms, is a subtype of
"traditional" organization, decentralized patrimonial authority.4 In its
pure case it can best be described negatively: (1) power relations
between those nominally super- and subordinate are not consistently
effective, (2) the central power is not free to select his administrative
staff, (3) governing powers are not centralized but are appropriated by
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the staff along with their positions, (4) there is no clear separation of
personal and administrative property, (5) there is no clearly defined
sphere of competency nor impersonal rules, (6) there is no regular
requirement of technical training, (7) salaries are not centrally fixed
and graded, and (8) there is no rational division of labor.f
Those familiar with Weber's work will recognize the characteristics of
feudal organization (or perhaps more accurately, feudal disorganiza-
tion) to be a direct negation of the characteristics of bureaucratic
organization. The relation between the two is almost dialectical with
feudal organization posed as the antithesis to the thesis of bureaucratic
organization. If bureaucracies are efficient organizations because
administrators are trained, the division of labor is rational, positions are
not owned or purchased, etc., then feudal organizations are inefficient
because of their lack of such characteristics. If this inference is
accurate, one might wonder why historical cases of feudalism have not
been both very rare and very early in their presence. The greater
efficiency of bureaucratic organizations suggests their triumph in any
confrontation with feudal organizations. Not only should the bureau ..
cratic army be more efficient, but bureaucratic economic enterprise
should be more successful than such quasi-feudal structures as the
manor and the guild. Given conditions of pure competition or pure
conflict, we must theoretically accept these conclusions. But pure
conflict, like pure competition, has been a rare empirical occurrence,
and challenges of bureaucratic armies to feudal regimes have no clear
cases in the Middle Ages.
On the other hand, under conditions of pure competition (as in
China during the period of the "Warring States" or in religious
organizations under the late Roman Empire) the most efficient
(bureaucratized) organizations are selected.
Historically competition appears to fluctuate from relatively pure
conditions to those which are less pure, and the advantage of
bureaucratic over feudal organization is thus expected to fluctuate also.
Consequently' the presence of feudal organization is not necessarily
synonymous with a short or transitional period. Nevertheless, given that
bureaucratic organization always retains some advantage, it remains to
be explained why feudal organization has not been confined to the
earliest historical periods. Feudal organization, as a lack of rational
organization, requires minimal social conditions for its establishment
and maintenance. Means of communication need not be effective and
may even represent a threat to its continuance. Political and military
organization does not require a money economy, and trade and
commerce may be minimal because of the lack of centralization.
Institutions for training officials are not necessary, for formal training is
not required. It is true that feudal organizations could exist in more
developed social conditions; however, they are not forces which
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implement social development and are conversely threatened by it.
In direct contrast, the establishment and maintenance of bureaucra-
tic structures requires a specific development of social conditions.
Remuneration in fixed money salary requires a developed money
economy with few fluctuations. Centralization requires extensive
commerce and effective lines of communication. Institutions are also
needed for bureaucratic training. In order to assure these conditions
over time political bureaucracies typically continually institute planning
together with increasingly intensive administration. The increase of
administrative tasks requires an increase in the size of the bureaucratic
organization which in turn leads to further planning and administration
because of increasing maintenance costs. But increases in size beyond a
point determined by the administrative technology of the period, will
result in a decline of the overall efficiency and thus require great
increases in size relative to small increases in administrative capability.
Furthermore, as bureaucracies develop over time they become tradi-
tionalized, statuses become inflated with administrators at all levels
demanding more elaborate and expensive styles of life. The result of
this we see around us, ever-expanding and more expensive administra-
tive bureaucracies. .
In the state property stage described by Marx and Engels develop-
ment beyond the boundaries of a single city-state was eventually
accomplished by bureaucratic political and military organization. These
organizations, with their ever-expanding economic needs, were based on
a more or less static, largely agrarian, subsistence economy. To the
extent that political bureaucratization did not result in increasingly
economic efficiency, the growth of the bureaucracy could be supported
only by territorial expansion. Once the limits of territorial expansion
were met, the economy could no longer support the expansion of the
bureaucracy. Decentralization would save money, reduce pressure on
trade and commerce, and allow payment in kind to administrators.
Direct grants of land for maintenance of administrators could result in
further simplification. The latter would result, of course, in feudalism.
Incorporating Marx and Weber eliminates the limitations of the
unilinear perspective; historical change in the feudal and bureaucratic
stages may be either unilinear or cyclic depending upon both the ethic
and the ability to use available technology. When Rome reached the
limits of its expansion, its bureaucracy grew as its tax base slowly
declined, and the weakened structure collapsed into feudalism with the
barbarian invasion. Fluctuations in China, however, more stongly
favored bureaucratic organization over feudalism. Bureaucratic organi-
zation there had additional economic support because of irrigation by
control of the river system. The more intensive exploitation of
irrigation both supported and was supported by the centralized
bureaucratic structure. As might be expected, China developed in a
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feudal direction during times of flood and extreme natural disaster. But
the economic advantage of river control and irrigation plus the
effieiency of the bureaucracy supported by it, meant that the feudal
rule would always be transitory.
Change between the two types of organization is dependent upon
prevailing conditions and thus may be either unilinear or cyclic. It is
strange that Marx, a so-called "economic determinist," did not consider
the important effect of the economic system on the political system -
perhaps it was the result of an overly simplistic view that the two are
the same. Treating them as identical would eliminate the possibility of
interdependence between them.
Modern bureaucratization does not rely on territorial expansion but
on the constantly expanding basis of capitalism. The expansion of
capitalism, since it has supported the expansion of bureaucracy, has
tended to stabilize itself because of the ability of the bureaucracy to
absorb the otherwise expected reserve industrial army. That, however,
is another topic.
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